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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20010205-CA 
v. : 
ERIC PINO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance in 
i 
I 
drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 2001), in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Lynn W. Davis presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress 
alleging that the police officer's search violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
1 
Standard of Review: "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-
erroneous standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the 
facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 
(Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession or use of 
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor. R. 21. Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest. R. 39-49. At the suppression 
hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 66-67, 127:27-28. 
At trial, the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to Count II 
of the information, dismissing that charge. R. 84-81. A jury convicted defendant as 
charged in Count I. R. 104, 129:146-48. Defendant was sentenced to thirty-six months 
2 
probation and ordered to complete a substance abuse program. R. 110-12, 128. 
Defendant timely appeals his conviction. R. 118-19. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
While on patrol in the afternoon of May 19,1999, Officer Ron Hughes observed 
defendant driving near the Greyhound Bus Depot in Provo. R. 129:66-67,78. Officer 
Hughes initiated a computer check of defendant's license plate with the database for the 
1
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict and to the trial 
court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76,12, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
In support of his claim, defendant cites the suppression and preliminary hearing 
transcripts. See Br. of Aplt. at 3-6, 12-14, 16 (citing preliminary hearing transcript (R. 
126:16-19, 25-28, 33, 36)). As neither party introduced the preliminary hearing transcript 
during the suppression hearing it is not clear that the trial court reviewed the same in 
ruling here. Most appellate courts (Utah has no rule), in reviewing the denial of a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence, will consider only evidence before the court at the 
suppression hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 724-725 (D.C. Cir. 
1992); Baez v. State, 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App. 1992); State v. Ryder, 3125 N.W.2d 
786, 788-789 (Iowa 1982); Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert, 
denied, 651 A.2d 854 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Powers, 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 
1979); 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.7(d) (1996). While some appellate 
courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a pretrial ruling, they 
generally do so in the context of affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. United States v. 
Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-1022 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 575 (1993); United 
States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 1239-1240 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basey, 
816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1054 n.l 1055 
(La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Duncan, 789 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra 
State v. Kong, 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1994) (reversal). Relying on this rule, 
at least one court has held that the denial of a suppression motion may be affirmed on 
appeal by relying on evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing. People v. Dennison, 
378 N.E.2d 220, 222-223 (111. 1978). Thus, the principle unifying these cases is that an 
appellate court may affirm, but will not reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the 
lower court at the time it ruled. 
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Utah Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). R. 129:67,78. Although defendant's 
license plate bore a current registration decal, the check revealed that defendant's 
registration had expired. R. 129:67. 
Defendant pulled into the parking lot behind the bus depot and Officer Hughes 
parked behind defendant. R. 129:67-68, 79. Officer Hughes approached the driver's side 
door of defendant's vehicle and requested defendant's drivers license, registration, and 
proof vehicle insurance. R. 129:68. Defendant handed Officer Hughes a Utah 
identification card and stated that he had recently purchased the vehicle and had not yet 
registered it in his name nor obtained insurance. Id. Officer Hughes returned to his 
vehicle with the identification card, radioed dispatch to send a tow truck, and prepared to 
issue a citation and impound defendant's vehicle. R, 129:69-70. 
Officer Mark Robinson overheard Officer Hughes' radio communication with 
dispatch and to insure officer safety, responded to the scene as a backup. R. 129:88. 
Upon his arrival, Officer Robinson observed defendant seated in his vehicle and 
recognized him from previous encounters. R. 129:89. After conversing with Officer 
Hughes, Officer Robinson approached defendant's vehicle. R. 127:15 In response, 
defendant exited his vehicle and came toward Officer Robinson, causing the officer to be 
concerned for his safety. Id. Officer Robinson briefly conversed with defendant about 
his prior drug problems. R. 127:17. Defendant denied any current drug use. Id. 
Having finished filling out the citation and the impound paperwork, Officer 
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Hughes gave defendant the citation and notified him that his vehicle was to be 
impounded. R. 129:69-72. Then, Officer Hughes told defendant that he could take his 
personal belongings out of the car before it was impounded. R. 129:72. Although 
Officer Hughes did not expressly tell defendant he could leave, at trial Officer Hughes 
testified that at that point, defendant was free to leave. R. 129:82. Defendant reached 
down inside his vehicle and grabbed a small black gym bag located beside him and began 
to leave. R. 129:72, 89-90. 
The search. As defendant was preparing to leave, Officer Robinson asked 
defendant "do you mind if I look in the bag?" R. 127:18; 129:72, 90. Defendant replied, 
"I don't mind it at all" and he handed his bag to the officer. R. 127:18; 129:90. Inside 
the bag, Officer Robinson discovered several small baggies consistent with those used to 
package drugs. R.129:72-75, 91-94, 96, 100-01,106-07. Officer Hughes then searched 
defendant's person, and subsequently caught him trying to drop a small plastic fuse box 
also containing baggies, down the back of his shirt. R. 129:75-76, 92-93, 95-96. Some of 
the baggies contained white powdery residue which later tested positive for 
methamphetamine. R. 129:74,76, 100-05, 128-33. At trial, the officers testified that the 
incident occurred in a drug free zone—within 1000 feet of a strip mall and a church. R. 
129:85, 97,108-14. 
The suppression hearing. Officer Robinson testified at the suppression hearing 
that between a year to a year-and-a-half before the present incident, defendant had 
5 
specifically threatened to kill him and other officers during a search of defendant's home. 
R. 127:6-14, 20-21. Officer Robinson also testified that based on his experiences with 
defendant, defendant's demeanor during previous encounters was unstable. R. 127:15-
16. On this occasion, Officer Robinson observed that defendant's eyes were glazed and 
that his demeanor was unusually mellow yet unstable, which based upon the officer's 
experience, indicated that defendant was under the influence of drugs. R. 127:16-17,22-
25. Additionally, defendant's large stature, defendant's act of exiting his vehicle toward 
Officer Robinson as the officer was approaching the vehicle, defendant's act of reaching 
down and grabbing his bag after being informed that his car would be impounded, and the 
fact that the bag was large enough to conceal a weapon caused Officer Robinson to fear 
for his and officer Hughes' safety. See R. 127:14-25. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug 
evidence obtained in a search of his bag following a routine traffic stop. Defendant's 
claim fails for two reasons: 1) based on the correct test for determining the voluntariness 
a consent to search as offered in United States v. Abbott and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
defendant cannot claim that his consent was involuntarily given; and 2) the search was 
not the result of prior illegal police conduct where the scope of the stop was not 
expanded, the officer was justified in performing a protective frisk, and the event had de-
escalated to a level-one encounter. Accordingly, where the search was justified under 
those exceptions to the warrant requirement, defendant's claim fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S BAG WAS 
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia discovered in the search of his bag and person. 
Br. of Aplt. at 15. Defendant argues that the warrantless search violated his Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, contending that police 
exceeded the scope of the traffic detention by asking to search his bag, and that the trial 
court erred in ruling that the search was justified as a protective frisk. Br. of Aplt. at 8-
10,15-17. Additionally, although raised for the first time on appeal, defendant argues 
that his consent to search the bag was not voluntary and was obtained through a prior 
illegal detention. Br. of Aplt. at 10-15. For the following reasons, defendant's claims 
lack merit. 
A. Defendant failed to preserve his claim that his consent was 
involuntary in the trial court; notwithstanding that failure, 
defendant's consent to search was voluntary. 
Defendant claims that his consent to search the bag was not freely and voluntarily 
given. Br. of Aplt. at 20-25. Defendant's claims fail, however, for two reasons: 2) 
defendant failed to preserve it in the trial court; and 2) defendant cannot show that his 
consent was involuntarily offered. 
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1. Waiver. 
In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that his consent was the result of prior 
illegal conduct by the police. R. 39-49. For the first time on appeal, defendant argues 
that his consent to search was involuntary. See generally R. 127. Defendant argues no 
exception to the preservation rule. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-15. "[W]here a defendant fails 
to assert a particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial 
court, an appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal." State v. Carter, 101 
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); see e.g., State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990). 
Moreover, "the failure to assert a particular ground in a pre-trial suppression motion 
operates as a waiver of the right to challenge the subsequent admission of evidence on 
that ground" Carter, 707 P.2d at 660 (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, 
this Court should decline defendant's invitation to consider the voluntariness of his 
consent. 
2. Defendant's consent was voluntary. 
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to preserve his claim for appeal, his consent 
was voluntary. Evidence seized in a consent search will be admissible in court if: (1) the 
consent was voluntary, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of a 
prior illegality. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). In this case, defendant's 
consent was voluntary and was not obtained as the result of a prior illegality. 
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(i) The standard. 
On appeal, defendant argues that this Court's decision in State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 
433 (Utah App. 1996), establishes the analytical framework for determining whether the 
consent was voluntary. Aplt. Brf. at 11. Ham relies on language from United States v. 
Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), for the standard by which voluntariness of a 
consent is analyzed. Quoting Abbott, the Court in Ham held that the following three 
requirements must be met to establish that voluntary consent was given: 
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
'unequivocal and specific5 and 'freely and intelligently' given; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, 
express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, [ ]] 
the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence 
that such rights were waived." 
Ham, 910 P.2d at 439 (quoting Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885) (other citations omitted). 
Although in Ham and in several other cases, this Court has employed the Abbott standard 
in voluntariness determinations, the Utah Supreme Court has never adopted the Abbott 
standard in assessing the voluntariness of a consent. See, e.g., State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 
547, 551 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993), 
aff'd, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1996); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,127 
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App. 1990); State v. 
9 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990).2 Recently this Court applied the Abbott 
standard found in Ham in State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f 18, 17 P.3d 1135. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari review on 
that ground. See State v. Hansen, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001). 
Continued reliance on the Abbott standard is problematic because the third Abbott 
requirement creating a presumption against waiver has since been rejected by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and is contrary to United States Supreme 
Court precedent. The third prong of the Abbott standard as adopted in Ham and other 
appellate decisions of this Court is that the court must "indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived." Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885. Four years 
later, however, the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth held that "unlike those 
constitutional guarantees that protect a defendant at trial, it cannot be said every 
reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment" of the 
right against searches. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242-43 (1973) 
(emphasis added). Citing Schneckloth, the Tenth Circuit abandoned the third Abbott 
requirement in 1991, holding that "a district court determining the admissibility of 
2Although the Utah Court of Appeals applied the Abbott standard in Harmon, 854 
P.2d at 1040, in affirming that decision, the Utah Supreme Court did not adopt that 
standard. See State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1206-08 (Utah 1996). Instead, the Utah 
Supreme Court focused solely on whether the consent was "the product of duress and 
coercion." Id. at 1206. 
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evidence should not presume a defendant's consent to a search is either involuntary or 
voluntary." United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1991) {citing 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242-43); accord United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1500 
(10th Cir. 1996). Given the Supreme Court's holding that such a presumption should not 
be given and the Tenth Circuit's subsequent abandonment of the presumption, this Court 
is constrained to reject the outdated standard as set forth in Abbott and Ham. 
Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Schneckloth, the 
appropriate standard by which consent searches should be judged is best articulated as a 
two part inquiry: First, the State must "prove that consent was given." Villano v. United 
States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962). The consent must be "unequivocal and 
specific." Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885. Second, the State must establish that the consent was 
voluntary. In other words, the State must "prove consent was given without duress or 
coercion, express or implied." Id. See Schneckloth, All U.S. at 225-29, 233. 
Accordingly, a consent is constitutionally invalid and the search unreasonable "if under 
all the circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily—that it 
was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful 
authority." Id. at 233. 
(ii) Defendant voluntarily gave unequivocal and 
specific consent to search his bag. 
Here, although defendant concedes that his consent was specifically and 
unequivocally given, he argues that it was not voluntary. See Br. of Aplt. at 11. The Utah 
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Supreme Court has identified the following factors which may show the consent was 
voluntary, and not the product of duress or coercion: "1) the absence of a claim of 
authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 
3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the 
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer." State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 
103,106 (Utah 1980). 
A review of those factors in this case supports the trial court's conclusion that the 
consent was in fact voluntary. Officer Robinson claimed no right to search, but simply 
asked for consent to search. R. 127:18. There was no evidence that the officer used 
deception or trickery to obtain consent, making neither promises nor threats. See 
generally R. 129. Nor is there any evidence that Officer Robinson pulled out or 
otherwise displayed his weapon. See id. Moreover, when Officer Robinson politely 
asked if he could search defendant's bag, defendant cooperated by stating that "he did not 
mind," voluntarily handing the bag to the officers. R. 127:18. Thus, defendant's consent 
was voluntary. 
(iii) State v. Hansen and Ohio v. Robinette are 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
In support of his claim, defendant compares his case to State v. Hansen, 2000 UT 
App 353,17 P.3d 1135, and Ohio v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997). Br. of Aplt. 
at 11-12. Notwithstanding their reliance on the incorrect third prong of the Abbott 
standard—presumption against voluntariness, both Hansen and Robinette are 
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distinguishable from the present case. 
In Hansen, the defendant was stopped for no insurance and for making an 
improper lane change. Hansen, 2000 UTApp 353, \2. After issuing a warning to 
defendant and returning defendant's drivers license and registration the officer asked 
Hansen if he had any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in his vehicle. Id. at f 4. Hansen replied 
that he did not have any such items. Id. The officer then asked Hansen, "Do you mind if 
I check?" Id. At trial, the officer testified that Hansen responded "Yes." Id. However, 
the officer could not remember Hansen's exact response to his question. Id. at f 21. 
Based on the ambiguity of the verbal exchange between Hansen and the officer, this 
Court applied the presumption against waiver of a constitutional right and determined that 
Hansen's consent was not voluntary. Id. at ffl[ 19-21, 25. 
Here, like Hansen Officer Robinson asked defendant, "Do you mind if I look in 
the bag?" R. 127:18; 129:72, 90. However, unlike Hansen, defendant replied, "I don't 
mind it at all" and he handed the bag to Officer Robinson. R. 127:18; 129:90. 
Defendant's unequivocal answer to Officer Robinson's question and his act of then 
handing the bag to the officer are significant distinguishing facts. Because the verbal 
exchange between Officer Robinson and defendant, and defendant's act of handing the 
bag to the officer are not ambiguous, there is no question that the consent was voluntary. 
Thus Hansen does not apply to the instant case. 
Defendant's reliance on Robinette is also misplaced. In Robinette, the officer 
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stopped Robinette for speeding, issued him a verbal warning, returned his drivers licence 
and then stated, "One question before you get gone [sic]: are you carrying any illegal 
contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" Robinette, 
685 N.E.2d at 764. When Robinette responded that he did not have any comtraband in the 
car, the officer asked if he could search the vehicle. Id. Robinette answered "yes." Id. 
The Ohio Supreme Court focused on the officer's statement "[o]ne question before you 
get gone [sic], " determining that "[the officer's] words did not give Robinette any 
indication that he was free to go, but rather implied just the opposite—that Robinette was 
not free to go until he answered [the officer's] additional questions." Id. at 770. 
Accordingly, the Robinette court held that because the officer wrongly detained Robinette 
his consent was coerced. Id. at 771. 
Robinette differs from the instant case because Officer Robinson's question, "Do 
you mind if I look in the bag?" was in no way coercive. Moreover, unlike the officer's 
question in Robinette, Officer Robinson's question did not prevent defendant from 
responding in the negative and leaving. Thus, Robinette is inapplicable to the present 
case. 
B. Defendant's consent to search his car was not obtained by police 
exploitation of a prior illegality. 
Having resolved that defendant's consent was voluntary, the Court must determine 
whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. See Arroyo, 
796 P.2d at 688. Defendant claims that although the purpose of the stop v/as completed, 
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Officer Robinson impermissibly extended the detention by asking to search defendant's 
bag. Br. of Aplt. at 14. When Officer Robinson asked this question, however, the 
detention had already terminated. 
"The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a 
citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,108-09 (1977) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19 (1968)). In other words, "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment is n o t . . . a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681 (1985). 
In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop and detention as occurred here, 
a dual inquiry applies. Id. The first question is "whether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception," and the second is "whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. (quoting Terry, 
392 U.S. at 20). See also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994). This 
Court also looks "to the totality of the circumstances present at the time of the stop to 
determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity." State v. 
Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 
137,141 (Utah App. 1997)). 
Defendant does not assert that the instant stop was unjustified. Br. of Aplt. at 8. 
Therefore, the issues here are (1) whether Officer Robinson exceeded the reasonable 
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scope of the stop's primary traffic purpose when he asked defendant about his prior drug 
problems preceding the traffic violations; (2) whether the subsequent Terry frisk of 
defendant was justified by objective safety concerns; and (3) after defendant was free to 
leave, whether the officer's request to search constituted a mere level one encounter. 
1. Questioning about defendant's prior drug usage did not 
unreasonably expand the scope of the traffic stop. 
It is well established that a "detention incident to a traffic stop 'must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop/" Lopez, 873 
P.2d at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Additionally, the 
length and scope of the stop must be "'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances 
which rendered its initiation permissible." Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). 
However, "a valid investigatory stop may include 'a request for identification and inquiry 
concerning the suspicious conduct of the person detained." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133 
(quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981)). See also Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) ("A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions."). 
This means that during a routine traffic stop, police may request a driver's license 
and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. However, once 
the driver has produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the 
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vehicle, 'he must be allowed to proceed on the his way, without being subject to further 
delay by police for additional questioning. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah App. 1990)). In a routine traffic stop, "investigative 
questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of 
more serious criminal activity." Id. This is not to say, however, that mere questioning 
constitutes either a search or a seizure. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,434 (1991) 
("Since Terry, we have repeatedly held that mere police questioning does not constitute a 
seizure."). See also United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e 
reject any notion that a police officer's questioning, even on a subject unrelated to the 
purpose of the stop, is itself a Fourth Amendment violation."). 
Here, defendant claims that questioning about his prior and present drug usage 
was unreasonable because Officer Robinson did not observe any behavior giving rise to 
a reasonable suspicion of a drug usage. Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. This contention narrowly 
overlooks Officer Robinson's observations about defendant's strange demeanor. 
Specifically, the officer observed that defendant's eyes were glazed and his demeanor 
was mellow yet unstable. See R. 127:16-17, 22-25. Based on the officer's experience, 
this behavior reasonably suggested a possible drug offense. Id. See State v. Rodriguez-
Lopi, 954 P.2d at 1292 (recognizing court must consider "the totality of the 
circumstances" at the time of the stop or detention to determine if there was an objective 
basis for suspecting criminality); State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183,185 (Utah App. 1996) 
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(In determining the reasonableness of a given situation, "common sense and ordinary 
human experience must govern over rigid criteria.") (quotations omitted)). Accordingly, 
given the officer's observations of defendant's strange demeanor, his questions 
concerning defendant's prior and present drug usage were reasonable. 
However, even if the questioning is deemed objectively unreasonable, it was not 
the questioning that lead to the discovery of methamphetamine in defendant's bag and on 
his person—it was the subsequent protective frisk. 
2. The trial court correctly concluded that the protective 
frisk revealing controlled substances in defendant's bag 
and on his person, was objectively reasonable. 
The circumstances surrounding the protective frisk here give rise to an objectively 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was potentially dangerous. Officer Robinson 
noticed defendant's suspicious demeanor, but did not observe defendant's bag until 
defendant had learned that his car was to be impounded and was about to leave. See R. 
127:15-17. Moreover, Officer Robinson was plainly aware that during the prior year, 
defendant had specifically threatened his life. Accordingly, the trial court found that 
performing a protective frisk after issuing a citation and impoundment record was 
reasonable: 
Well, it appears to me that if an investigatory officer's life has been 
threatened by the defendant, and he has threatened to kill that offic er, and 
the officer at the date in question still maintains that fear reasonably, that it 
is proper to search a bag that would have been within a wingspan control of 
the defendant. [Officer Robinson is] indicating that he had numerous 
contacts with [defendant] over a period of time, that he was acquainted 
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with [defendant], [that the officer] did not deem [defendant] to be a stable 
individual previously and had [the officer's] life threatened. [The officer 
noted] [t]hat [defendant] is large of stature, [the officer] believed that 
[defendant] was a bit out of it, [that defendant was experiencing] some 
form of stupor, that [defendant] had a glaze in his eyes, [and] thought that 
[defendant] might be under the influence of drugs. And when [defendant] 
reached into the vehicle that [the officer] inquired of him. "May I search 
the bag?" As [defendant] retrieved it, [the officer] testified that this 
defendant said, "I don't mind at all." And it was within that bag that drug 
paraphernalia was then discovered, and then evidently a Terry frisk [was 
performed] after that of the defendant. Because of the personal threat to kill 
the officer there is a basis upon which for officer's safety and security to 
search a bag that may in fact contain a weapon. 
R. 127:27-28. 
The trial court's ruling should be upheld. Police are entitled to take reasonable 
precautionary actions to ensure their safety during the course of a traffic investigation. 
State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998). Here, Officer Robinson's 
objective safety concern was real and reasonable. The United States Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized the danger facing police during traffic stops. In Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997), the Supreme Court observed that '[i]n 1994 alone, 
there were 5,672 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops." 
The Supreme Court has previously noted that approximately 30% of police shootings 
occur when an officer approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032, 1049 n.13 (1983); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 
(1973) (FBI report indicates that 11 of 35 police officers murdered in a three-month 
period were killed when the officers were making a traffic stop); 4 W. LaFave, Search 
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and Seizure, § 9.5(a), 254-255 n.33 (3d. ed. 1996) (more officers are shot while 
conducting field interrogations than while dealing with known felons, and 43% of officer 
shootings that occurred pursuant to a vehicle stop take place after the initial contact has 
been made). Utah law enforcement is not immune from the national trend. See, e.g., 
State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8 ffi[2-5, 994 P.2d 177 (passenger in traffic stop shot at officer 
after ignoring repeated requests to show his hands); State v. Johnson, 784 P,2d 1135, 
1137 (Utah 1989) (driver shot at officer without warning as officer approached vehicle). 
The trial court correctly found that Officer Robinson articulated particularized 
facts which gave him a reasonable belief that defendant was canying a weapon in his bag. 
In his brief, defendant dissects the facts that confronted Officer Robinson the night of the 
arrest and argues that these facts fail to support articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. "Looking at each fact in isolation . . . is not proper." State v. 
Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1992). Rather, defendant must examine all the 
facts and inferences viewed together. See id. Here, See R. 127:26-27. Specifically, 
Officer Robinson testified that during a search of defendant's home the prior year, 
defendant, in a fit of anger, expressly threatened to kill him and other officers. See R. 
127:6-14,20-21; State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah App. 1993) (although not 
determinative, a previous police encounter may be relevant to a suspicion that a suspect 
might be presently dangerous, depending on the nature of the interaction). In addition, 
the officer cited defendant's unstable demeanor during previous encounters, defendant's 
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large stature, the officer's numerous encounters with defendant, defendant's present 
demeanor including his glazed eyes and unstable demeanor which based upon the 
officer's experience, indicated that defendant was under the influence of drugs, 
defendant's act of exiting his vehicle toward Officer Robinson as the officer was 
approaching, defendant's act of reaching down and grabbing his bag after being informed 
that his car would be impounded, and the fact that the bag was large enough to conceal a 
weapon, as reasons for suspecting that defendant was harboring a weapon in his bag. See 
R. 127:14-25; White, 856 P.2d at 660 (an officer may rely on experience to fortify his 
reasonable suspicion). Accordingly, the totality of the particularized facts articulated by 
Officer Robinson led the officer to reasonably suspect that defendant may be armed. 
Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that Officer Robinson was justified in 
performing a protective frisk of defendant's bag. See Carter, 707 P.2d at 659. 
3. Because the traffic stop had de-escalated to a level-one 
consensual encounter, the officer was justified in asking to 
search defendant's bag. 
The courts have recognized three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement and the public: (1) consensual encounters in which the person 
is free to leave, (2) brief investigatory stops based on articulable suspicion that the person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime, and (3) arrests based on probable cause. 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App. 55,110, 998 P.2d 274 {citing State v. Dietman, 739 
P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1997) (per curiam)). The issue here, therefore, is whether Officer 
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Hughes' issuance of the citation and impound record converted the level-two detention of 
defendant into a level-one consensual encounter. 
The Tenth Circuit has held that "'after an officer issues the citation and returns any 
materials provided, the driver is illegally detained only if the driver has objectively 
reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave.'" United States v. Anderson, 
114 F.3d 1059,1064 (10th Cir. 1997) {quoting United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 
1501 (10th Cir. 1996)). Defendant has shown no such cause. 
A level-two detention converts to a level-one, consensual encounter if, "either 
from the words of [the] officer or from the clear import of the circumstances," a 
reasonable person would believe he or she is free to leave. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 
1242,1244 (Utah 1994). Factors that suggest a detention exists, or in the converse, that a 
detention has not ended, include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display 
of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use 
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might 
be compelled." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); accord State v. 
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1996); Anderson, 114 F.3d at 1059. 
In this case, Officer Hughes issued defendant a citation and impound report. R. 
129:68-72. Defendant was not surrounded by officers. R. 67 (Findings, f 67). Although 
a second officer, Officer Robinson, arrived after Officer Hughes had walked back to his 
car, Officer Robinson separately conversed with defendant while Officer Hughes was 
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completing the paper work. R. 129:88-90. The record is silent as to whether Officer 
Robinson was armed, but there is no indication that he used otherwise displayed his 
weapon. See generally R. 129. Nor was there any evidence suggesting that he physically 
touched defendant or used any means of coercion. See id. In short, Officer Hughes' 
issuance of a citation and the impound report signaled the end of the detention such that a 
reasonable person would feel free to leave. 
Defendant focuses on the fact that Officer Hughes did not expressly state that 
defendant was "free to leave." Br. of Aplt. at 9. The Fourth Amendment does not require 
particular language, or words at all, to signal the end of a detention. See Higgins, 884 
P.2d at 1244. Indeed, any requirement that an officer expressly state that defendant was 
"free to leave" would be contrary to the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). In that case, the High Court expressly 
rejected as unrealistic any requirement that police officers "always inform detainees that 
they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary." Id. at 39-40. 
Accordingly, Officer Hughes was not required to expressly inform defendant that 
he was free to leave. The clear import of his actions in issuing a citation and impound 
report then telling defendant to remove his personal items from the car before it was 
impounded, was that defendant was free to leave. Contrary to defendant's claim, Officer 
Robinson's subsequent request to search defendant's bag—which could not have taken 
more than a few seconds—did not extend the level two detention. Officers are free to 
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pose questions to the public and a citizen's decision to answer the question does not 
escalate the encounter into a level two detention. See State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 768 
(Utah App. 1990) (holding that a seizure did not occur by virtue of the officer's request 
for identification), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
In Patefield, an officer stopped a driver for a burnt out license plate bulb. 927 P.2d 
at 656. After the officer gave the driver a verbal warning to repair the broken light, the 
defendant offered to fix it. Id. at 656-57. The officer remained at the location, assisting 
the driver by holding a flashlight. Id. at 656. When the driver opened the sliding door of 
his van to retrieve a toolbox, the officer observed several open containers of beer in the 
van. Id. A subsequent search of the van revealed marijuana. Id. at 651. This Court 
identified the issue as "whether, when viewed from an objective standard, someone in 
[the driver's] position would reasonably have felt free to leave after [the officer] gave the 
equipment failure warning." Id. at 659. Although no testimony was given indicating 
whether or not the defendant's driver's license was returned or that the defendant was 
free to leave, the Court nevertheless concluded that a reasonable person would have felt 
free to leave. Id. at 656, 659. In so concluding, the Court observed that nothing in the 
facts suggested that the officer compelled the driver to repair the light. Id. at 659.3 
Indeed, as the Court noted, "[t]he record [was] void of any evidence suggesting that [the 
3The defendant in Patefield had conceded that the officer "meant only to issue a 
verbal warning." 927 P.2d at 659. 
24 
officer] 'use[d] . . . language or [a] tone of voice' demonstrating that [the driver] was 
compelled to fix the light on the spot." Id. at 660 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554) 
(all but first bracket in original). 
Likewise in this case, nothing in the facts suggests that Officer Robinson used 
language or a tone of voice demonstrating that defendant was compelled to respond to his 
question or consent to a search. Officer Robinson politely asked if defendant would mind 
if he searched the bag, he did not make any threats or promises. R. 127:18. As explained 
above, no show of force was made and the request was made after Officer Hughes told 
defendant that he could take his personal belongings and leave. R. 129:72. As such, the 
exchange was a consensual encounter in which defendant voluntarily chose to participate. 
The two brief questions did not extend the detention. The stop had ceased and defendant 
voluntarily consented to the questioning. Therefore, the evidence seized pursuant to the 
consent search was not tainted by a prior illegality. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
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